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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POST-CRITICAL BELIEF SCALE:
INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS
Bart Duriez, Jessie Dezutter, Bart Neyrinck & Dirk Hutsebaut
Recently, Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut (2003) have 
shown that the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez, Fon-
taine & Hutsebaut, 2000) captures the two orthogonal bipolar 
dimensions of Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence and 
Literal versus Symbolic along which Wulff (1991, 1997) organ-
ized the various possible approaches to religion. This chapter 
outlines the original and valuable contribution of the PCBS 
to the field of the psychology of religion by showing how the 
PCBS sheds a new light on several hotly debated topics within 
the psychology of religion. 
In the early 1960s, a guy called Zimmerman wrote a song called »The times 
they are a-changin’.« Meanwhile, times have changed. More than ever, we 
find ourselves exposed to other cultures, other religions, other politics, other 
ways of building ethical frameworks, ... Because of this, we have entered 
a time of unprecedented thinking and rethinking. A time also in which 
beliefs about belief are shaken as never before. We can no longer convince 
ourselves, let alone others, that our religious story is the »true« one, or even 
that religion actually adds value to life. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is 
growing consensus among philosophers that religious ideas cannot be under-
stood apart from the people and the language systems that created them. It is 
against this background that one should interpret the writings of the French 
philosopher Ricoeur (1970). Ricoeur tried to answer the question why some 
people still call themselves religious, and how this is possible after the athe-
ist critique as formulated by, among others, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, 
who have tried to unveil religion as, respectively, opium for the masses and 
wishful thinking. Ricoeur concludes that in order to make it possible for 
religious contents to stay meaningful in spite of this, a restorative interpreta-
tion is necessary. In this respect, Ricoeur introduced the concepts of Second 
Naïveté and Post-Critical Belief. 
 Relying on the work of Ricoeur (1970), Wulff (1991, 1997) recently 
provided an interesting new perspective on religious attitudes. According to 
Wulff, all possible approaches to religion can be located in a two-dimension-
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al space along two orthogonal bipolar dimensions. The vertical axis in this 
space, the Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence dimension, specifies 
the degree to which the objects of religious interest are granted participation 
in a transcendent reality. The horizontal axis, the Literal versus Symbolic 
dimension, indicates whether religion is interpreted literally or symbolically. 
In this way four quadrants are defined, each covering a specific attitude to-
wards religion: Literal Inclusion, Literal Exclusion, Symbolic Exclusion and 
Symbolic Inclusion (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Two-componential consensus representation of the PCBS items 
(items appearing in the 33 item and the 18 item version are underlined) 
 
The theoretical model of Wulff (1991, 1997) implies a departure from the 
established models within the field of the psychology of religion, such as 
the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness (e.g., Allport & 
Ross, 1967) and the quest dimension that was introduced as an extension of 
this model (Batson, 1976). Although Batson’s quest dimension, which refers 
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to an open ended search for the meaning in religious contents, can be situ-
ated at the symbolic end of Wulff’s model, Allport’s dimensions of extrinsic 
and intrinsic religiosity cannot be situated in this model. Whereas Allport 
made a distinction between the underlying motivations of the religiously, 
Wulff’s model is situated at the level of social cognitions. Therefore, the 
classification of Allport and Wulff are logically unrelated. An extrinsic 
religious person can either deal with religious contents in a literal or in a 
symbolic way. The same is true for an intrinsic religious person. In addi-
tion, Wulff’s model can be extended to non-religious persons as well. A 
non-religious person can neither be extrinsically religious nor intrinsically 
religious. However, he can be dealing with religious contents either in a 
literal or in a symbolic way. 
 In an attempt to measure the different approaches of religion that Wulff 
(1991, 1997) described within a Christian context, Duriez, Fontaine, and 
Hutsebaut (2000) recently proposed the 33 item Post-Critical Belief Scale 
(PCBS; see Appendix A). All items of this scale are scored on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree), over 4 (neither agree 
nor disagree), to 7 (completely agree). The PCBS consists of four subscales: 
Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté. Duriez et 
al. (2000) have shown that these subscales provide accurate measures of 
Wulff’s approaches to religion, with Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativ-
ism and Second Naiveté providing reliable indices of, respectively, Literal 
Inclusion, Literal Exclusion, Symbolic Exclusion and Symbolic Inclusion. 
Even more recently, Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, and Hutsebaut (2003) have 
shown that, once individual differences in response styles are corrected for, 
two components are sufficient to explain the empirical relations between the 
PCBS items and that these two components can be interpreted in terms of 
Exclusion versus Inclusion and Literal versus Symbolic. Figure 1 provides 
a visualization of the average two-componential structure that was reported 
by Fontaine et al. (2003). In Appendix A, each item is accompanied by a 
label that indicates whether this item was intended to capture Orthodoxy, 
External Critique, Relativism, or Second Naiveté, and that allows its identi-
fication in Figure 1.
 The major drawback of the original 33 item version is that it is a fairly 
lengthy questionnaire which contains some lengthy and complex questions. 
To solve this problem, Duriez, Soenens, and Hutsebaut (2005) recently 
proposed a shortened and simplified 18 item version of the Post-Critical 
Belief Scale (see Appendix B). Again, once individual differences in re-
sponse styles are corrected for, two components are sufficient to explain the 
empirical relations between the PCBS items and, again, these two compo-
nents can be interpreted in terms of Exclusion versus Inclusion and Literal 
versus Symbolic. Figure 1 indicates which items of the original PCBS were 
retained in the 18 item version. Again, in Appendix B, each item is accom-
panied by a label that allows its identification in Figure 1.
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 In the remainder of this article, we will illustrate the importance of the 
Post-Critical Belief Scale by showing how this scale yields new insights 
with respect to some important debates within the psychology of religion. 
For this purpose, we will be looking at the relationships of the two factor 
scores that are derived from the Post-Critical Belief Scale and a host of 
external variables. These factor scores allow researchers to disentangle the 
effects of being religious or not (Exclusion versus Inclusion) from the way 
in which religious contents are processed (either literally or symbolically). 
It is important to keep in mind that, whenever correlations with external 
variables are described, a high score on Exclusion versus Inclusion refers 
to a tendency to include transcendence, and a high score on Literal versus 
Symbolic refers to a tendency to deal with religion in a symbolic way. In 
most cases, the correlations that are described are based on several samples 
that were collected in Flanders (Belgium) between 1998 and 2006. Details 
on these samples can be found in the original articles to which we refer.
Religion and Personality
A first debate within the psychology of religion is whether there is a relation 
between religiosity and personality, and if so, which personality traits relate 
to religiosity. More specifically, we will look at whether religious people are 
characterized by certain specific personality traits. A different but related 
debate concerns the relation between religiosity and identity development. 
More specifically, we will discuss whether religious people have a different 
way of dealing with identity issues.
Religion and Personality Traits
Early research into the relation between religion and personality traits us-
ing Eysenck’s three-dimensional personality model (PEN; Psychoticism, 
Extraversion & Neuroticism; e.g., Eysenck, 1998) confirmed the hypothesis 
that religiosity corresponds, at least to some extent, to individual differences 
in personality traits. Although some authors failed to find a link between 
religious attitudes and personality, a series of studies in a variety of cultures 
and denominations converged on the conclusion that religious people tend 
to be lower in Psychoticism. Regarding Extraversion and Neuroticism, no 
such convergence was reached, leading to the conclusion that these factors 
do not relate to religiosity (for recent overviews, see Duriez, Soenens & 
Beyers, 2004; Saroglou, 2002a). 
 Recently, Costa and McCrae (1978, 1992) presented the Five Factor 
Model of personality (FFM; Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientious-
ness, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience), which can be regarded as an 
extension of Eysenck’s model, with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
providing a two-dimensional view of low Psychoticism and Openness to 
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Experience constituting a new element. Positive relations between religios-
ity and Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were found. However, these 
relations are typically low, and sometimes even absent. Regarding the other 
factors, no clear relation with religiosity emerged (for recent overviews, 
see Duriez, Soenens & Beyers, 2004; Saroglou, 2002a). In spite of this, 
McCrae (1999) urged attention to Openness to Experience in order to 
understand religiosity. Individuals high in Openness to Experience have 
an active motivation to seek out the unfamiliar, which goes hand in hand 
with tolerance of ambiguity and open-mindedness, and which leads them to 
endorse liberal values (McCrae, 1996). Hence, Openness to Experience is 
considered highly relevant towards attitudes and ideologies in general. The 
supposed importance towards religiosity was supported by Streyffeler and 
McNally (1998), who found fundamentalist and liberal Protestants to differ 
with respect to this factor only, and by Saucier (2000), who found Open-
ness to Experience to relate negatively to alphaism (a broad social attitude 
dimension comprised of, among other things, conventional religion).
 In line with this, Duriez, Soenens and Beyers (2004) expected Openness 
to Experience to be only modestly related to being religious or not (and 
hence to be only modestly related to Exclusion versus Inclusion), but to 
be very important to understand the way in which people process religious 
contents (and hence to be strongly related to Literal versus Symbolic). The 
hypothesized importance of Openness to Experience was confirmed in a 
late adolescent sample. Additionally, a positive relation between Agreeable-
ness and Literal versus Symbolic was found. This was in line with McCrae 
(1999), who argued that, just like Openness to Experience (although to a 
lesser extent), Agreeableness is relevant to ideologies, and that, as a conse-
quence, a similar pattern of relations with ideologies might be expected. The 
other personality dimensions (Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Neuroti-
cism) were found unrelated to both Exclusion versus Inclusion and Literal 
versus Symbolic. And although Duriez & Soenens (2006a) have shown that 
the relations between Exclusion versus Inclusion and the personality factors 
may fluctuate quite a bit across different samples, the positive relation of 
Literal versus Symbolic with Openness to Experience and Agreeableness 
appeared highly stable.
Religion and Identity
According to Erikson (1968), the primary developmental task of adoles-
cence is the formation of a personal identity. In the process of searching 
and exploring one’s identity, the adolescent is thought to develop a personal 
view on issues of political, philosophical and religious nature. Therefore, an 
important question is whether differences in identity development relate to 
the acquisition of religious beliefs. In spite of this, research addressing the 
relation between religiosity and identity development is limited, and all of 
these studies have relied on Marcia’s (1966) identity status paradigm (for an 
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overview, see Duriez, Soenens & Beyers, 2004) Although this paradigm has 
proven its utility in empirical research (Marcia, 1980), it has been criticized 
for treating identity statuses as dispositional outcome variables (e.g., Côté 
& Levine, 1988; van Hoof, 1999). 
 In an attempt to conceptualize individual differences in identity develop-
ment in a more process-oriented way, Berzonsky (1990, 1992) proposed 
three identity styles or ways of processing information and of coping with 
problems that typically arise in identity crises during adolescence: The infor-
mational, the normative, and the diffuse / avoidant identity style. Informa-
tion oriented individuals deal with identity issues by actively seeking out, 
processing and utilizing identity relevant information. When confronted with 
information that is dissonant with their self-conceptions, adolescents will re-
vise and accommodate their self-perceptions. Normative oriented individuals 
focus on the normative expectations and prescriptions held up by significant 
others (e.g., parents or authority figures) and reference groups (e.g., a certain 
religious tradition), and adhere rigidly to their identity structures, into which 
they assimilate all identity-relevant information. Finally, diffuse/avoidant ori-
ented individuals procrastinate decisions about one’s identity, which results 
in a fragmented and loosely integrated identity structure.
 Analyses revealed relatively stable relations between the identity styles 
and the religiosity dimensions (Duriez, Soenens & Beyers, 2004; Duriez 
& Soenens, 2006a). First, adolescents who use an informational identity 
style tend to symbolically interpret religious contents, confirming the idea 
that they critically evaluate whether religious contents correspond to their 
self-definitions (Berzonsky, 1990). Second, a negative relation was found 
between adolescents’ use of a diffuse / avoidant identity style and Literal 
versus Symbolic. Based on the theory of Berzonsky (1990), adolescents 
using this identity style are indeed thought to interpret religious contents 
in a literal way because they are likely to avoid questioning difficult and 
personal issues such as religion. Third, late adolescents who use a normative 
identity style were found to be more religious, at least in a context that is 
characterized by a strong religious tradition. In addition, they also showed 
a slight but non-significant tendency to interpret religious contents in a 
literal way. This confirms the ideas of Berzonsky (1990) who claims that 
adolescents with a normative oriented identity style are likely to rely on and 
conform to the prescriptions and standards of significant others, reference 
groups, authorities, and traditions.
Religion and Ideology
The previous section leads to the conclusion that, although there are no spe-
cific personality traits to describe religious people, religious people tend to 
be characterized by a normative identity style, and, hence, are more likely to 
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rely on and conform to the prescriptions and standards of significant others, 
reference groups, authorities, and traditions. This takes us straight to another 
related debate within the psychology of religion: Do religious people have a 
different, more conservative ideology? Do religious people differ from non-
religious people in value orientation? Are they more likely to hold conserva-
tive beliefs? If so, is this merely a consequence of having different values, 
or do there also exist identifiable aspects of general cognitive functioning in 
which religious people differ from non-religious people? 
Religion and Value Orientations
The empirical study of religiosity-value relations has to be credited to 
Rokeach (1968), who asked subjects to rank a number of values and com-
pared religious and non-religious subjects with respect to the average rank 
order. He found religious subjects to rank certain values (e.g., salvation, for-
giveness & obedience) higher and other values (e.g., independence, pleas-
ure, intellectual & logical) lower than non-religious subjects. Most research 
on the religiosity-value relation was inspired by this approach. However, be-
cause values are treated as isolated entities, the multitude of relations leads 
to poorly organized results. A solution to this problem was proposed by 
Schwartz (1992), who identified ten distinct value types (Hedonism, Stimu-
lation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, 
Security, Power and Achievement). These value types are organized in a 
circular fashion, with value types with compatible goals being positively 
related and emerging adjacent to one another, and value types with conflict-
ing goals being negatively related and emerging opposite one another. In 
total, Schwartz (1992) identified three main value conflicts: (1) A conflict 
between Openness to Change and Conservation, opposing values referring 
to novelty and personal autonomy (Stimulation & Self-direction) to values 
leading to stability, certainty and social order (Tradition, Conformity & Se-
curity), (2) a conflict between Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence, 
opposing values referring to the pursuit of selfish interests (Achievement & 
Power) to values promoting the welfare of others (Benevolence & Univer-
salism), and (3) a conflict between values referring to the gratification of 
desire (Hedonism) and values implying self-restraint and the acceptance of 
external limits (Tradition & Conformity). 
 Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn and Hutsebaut (2005) have shown 
that the value pattern associated with Exclusion versus Inclusion relates to 
the conflict between Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction on the one 
hand and Tradition and Conformity on the other hand. These findings large-
ly replicate the findings of Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Saroglou, 
Delpierre and Dermelle (2004) and suggest that a dependence-autonomy 
rather than a conservation-openness conflict is the central intra-personal 
conflict for religiosity. Importantly, the value pattern associated with Exclu-
sion versus Inclusion showed virtually no correspondence with the Self-En-
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hancement versus Self-Transcendence conflict. In contrast, the value pattern 
associated with Literal versus Symbolic could almost perfectly be described 
in terms of the latter conflict. Apparently, whereas being religious does not 
seem to make a person sensitive for the well-being of others, dealing with 
religion in a symbolic way does. 
Religion and Conservative Beliefs
Researchers used to assume that political parties and attitudes could be ar-
rayed on a single left-right dimension (e.g., Lipset, 1960; McClosky, 1958). 
However, more recently it has been argued that the meaning of this dimen-
sion varies across nations and over time and is often insufficient to represent 
the relevant political dimensions in a society (Inglehart, 1990; Rokeach, 
1973). Middendorp (1978), for instance, analyzed the ideological com-
ponents of political conflicts and distinguished two unrelated dimensions 
rather than one. The first was labeled cultural conservatism versus progres-
sivism and concerns individual rights and readiness for social change. Cul-
tural conservatives are concerned with maintaining discipline in people’s 
lives, especially within the family (e.g., by making divorce difficult and by 
tightening controls over abortion and euthanasia), and are in favor of a harsh 
upbringing and traditional sex-roles. The second was labeled economic 
conservatism versus progressivism and concerns the desirable level of 
economic equality among people as well as the desirability of trade unions 
and governmental interference in economics, with economic conservatives 
opposing economic equality, trade unions and governmental interference 
in economy. A similar distinction was also made by other researchers (e.g., 
Lipset, 1981; Johnson & Tamney, 2001).
 Duriez (2003a) has shown that, whereas Cultural Conservatism relates 
to both Exclusion versus Inclusion and Literal versus Symbolic, Economic 
Conservatism is unrelated to these dimensions. As far as Exclusion versus 
Inclusion is concerned, these results are in line with other studies that have 
also reported a strong relationship between Cultural Conservatism and re-
ligiosity, as well as with studies that reported Economic Conservatism to be 
independent of religiosity (see Duriez, 2003a).
Religion and Cognitive Conservatism
Kruglanski (1989) argued that knowledge, beliefs and attitudes are arrived 
at through the process of a motivated search for information. A central 
construct in this theory is the need for nonspecific cognitive closure, which 
refers to the desire for any firm belief on a given topic, as opposed to further 
ambiguity. Though need for closure may vary as a function of the situation 
(e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993), 
it also represents a dimension of stable individual differences (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). According to Kruglanski (1989), the need for closure 
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might spring from various sources. In particular, five facets are assumed 
to represent the universe of the construct (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Persons with a high need for closure would (1) desire order and structure in 
their lives, (2) prefer predictable situations, (3) experience a desire to reach 
closure which is reflected in the decisiveness of judgments and choices, 
(4) experience ambiguous situations devoid of closure as aversive, and (5) 
be unwilling to have one’s knowledge and beliefs confronted and hence 
rendered insecure by inconsistent evidence or alternative opinions. Thus, 
some people may desire closure because they value ordered environments, 
whereas others may seek closure out of a concern for predictability, deci-
siveness, ambiguity avoidance, or sticking to their own knowledge, belief 
or opinion. Of course, closure may be desired for more than one reason. 
Hence, the different facets are considered additive in their impact on the 
total need for closure (Kruglanski et al., 1997). 
 Previous research suggests that at least some of the need for closure facets 
and related constructs are positively related to religiosity. In this respect, no 
matter how it was measured, religiosity has been shown to relate to intoler-
ance of ambiguity, dogmatism and rigidity. However, these relations are not 
always very strong. Some studies even suggest that religiosity is independent 
of intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism and rigidity (for recent overviews, 
see Duriez, 2003c; Saroglou, 2002b). Some studies seem to suggest that the 
way in which religion is perceived and treated might be more important than 
religiosity as such. Feather (1967), for instance, did find a relation between 
religious affiliation and intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism, but this 
relation was obscured by the kind of religious affiliation, with members of 
fundamentalist groups obtaining higher intolerance of ambiguity and dog-
matism scores than members of liberal religious groups (cf. Glass, 1971). 
In a similar vein, Stanley (1963) argued that it is fundamentalism that rep-
resents the religious manifestation of the closed mind, and Pargament et al. 
(1985) argued that churches may selectively attract and keep members with 
and / or shape members towards varying levels of tolerance of ambiguity.
 In line with these findings, Duriez (2003c) hypothesized that, rather than 
religion per se, dealing with religious contents in a fundamentalist, dogmat-
ic, literal way constitutes the real threat to reason. Hence, he expected need 
for closure to relate to Literal versus Symbolic, rather than to Exclusion 
versus Inclusion. However, both religiosity dimensions appeared to relate to 
need for closure (cf. Saroglou, 2002b). In spite of this apparent similarity, 
a closer look at the data revealed that these religiosity dimensions related 
to different facets of need for closure. Apparently, religious people have 
a higher need for closure than people who are less religious because they 
desire an ordered and predictable environment. This suggests some instru-
mentality of religion, which is in line with the point of view that religion, by 
offering a global worldview and a moral program, reduces the complexity of 
life and creates a psychologically safe environment (Schwartz & Huismans, 
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1995). In contrast, people who deal with religious contents in a literal way 
have a higher need for closure than people who deal with religious content 
in a symbolical way because they need to avoid ambiguity or are unwilling 
to have their beliefs confronted by alternative opinions. Thus, apparently, 
whereas religious belief as such seems associated with a mere preference for 
order, structure, and predictability, it is those who deal with religious con-
tent in a literal way who are incapable of dealing with alternative opinions.
Religion and Intolerance
The previous section suggests that religious people tend to have different 
value priorities, tend to subscribe culturally conservative beliefs, and tend to 
differ in general cognitive functioning by having a heightened need for order, 
structure, and predictability. These findings are in line with the finding that 
religious people are characterized by a normative identity style, and, hence, 
are more likely to rely on and conform to the prescriptions and standards 
of significant others, reference groups, authorities, and traditions. Given the 
fact that indices of cognitive conservatism have often been shown to predict 
prejudice (e.g., Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004), this takes us straight 
to what is probably the most important paradox within the psychology of 
religion. Whereas all world religions proclaim brotherly love, history is lit-
tered with moments in which religion has provided a justification for, or has 
given cause to, atrocities directed towards people from a different religion, 
a different culture, a different race, a different sex, or a different sexual ori-
entation. A number of historians and theologians concluded from this that 
religion should be considered as a catalyst for prejudice and intolerance, 
and a lot of psychological and sociological research has been carried out to 
investigate this (for a recent research overview, see Duriez, 2004a). First, 
we will look at how religion relates to some of the most important prejudice 
dispositions that were identified in previous research. Second, we will look 
more specifically at the relationship between religion and ethnic prejudice.
Religion and Prejudice Dispositions
Two research lines have dominated the quest for the antecedents of preju-
dice. The first has viewed prejudice as resulting from group processes (e.g., 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The second has regarded it as a result of dispositional 
factors making people more or less likely to adopt prejudice (e.g., Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & San ford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994). The latter approach received support 
from research that demonstrated the generality of prejudice. That is, people 
that are unfavorable to one outgroup tend to be unfavorable to other out-
groups (e.g., Duckitt, 1992). This generality principle has been interpreted 
as suggesting stable individual differences which predispose people to adopt 
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prejudice. Two individual difference dimensions have received empirical 
support. The first – the authoritarian personality – was introduced by Ador-
no et al. (1950), and was reconceptualized to Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(RWA) by Altemeyer (1981). RWA can be defined as the covariation of 
(1) a strict adherence to conventional norms and values (conventionalism), 
(2) an uncritical subjection to authority (authoritarian submission), and (3) 
feelings of aggression towards norm violators (authoritarian aggression). 
The second – the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) – was introduced 
by Pratto et al. (1994) as a dimension delineating the extent to which one 
desires the ingroup to dominate outgroups. And although, according to Alte-
meyer (1998), RWA and SDO constitute two faces of the authoritarian per-
sonality, with RWA referring to authoritarian submission and SDO referring 
to authoritarian dominance, research has shown that both constructs have 
a different genesis and are powerful but relatively independent predictors 
of prejudice (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 2002; 
Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005; Van Hiel, et al., 2004). 
 Among other things, Duriez and Van Hiel (2002) focused on the relation 
between the PCBS and RWA and SDO. Their results suggest that, whereas 
Literal versus Symbolic relates negatively to RWA and SDO, Exclusion 
versus Inclusion relates positively to RWA but is unrelated to SDO. These 
findings support previous research that has shown fundamentalism to be 
typical of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996) and religiosity to be typi-
cal of RWA but not SDO (Altemeyer, 1998; Saucier, 2000; Van Hiel and 
Mervielde, 2002). It is important to note that, according to some research-
ers, three factors can be discerned within the RWA scale: Punitive authority, 
sexual morality, and rejecting dissent. The religiosity-RWA relation would 
be caused by sexual morality (Schluderman, Schluderman, Needham, 
Mulega & Huynh, 2003). This might explain the relations of RWA with 
Exclusion versus Inclusion, suggesting that this relationship can be reduced 
to differences in values and attitudes.
Religion and Ethnic Prejudice
Following the reasoning of Schluderman et al. (2003), it might be that, 
although being religious seems to go hand in hand with certain aspect of 
(right-wing) authoritarianism, it might not be related to those aspects of 
(right-wing) authoritarianism that predict racism and ethnic prejudice. 
Therefore, Duriez (2004a, Duriez, Appel & Hutsebaut, 2003) examined the 
relationship between religiosity and ethnic prejudice in more detail. Results 
show that Exclusion versus Inclusion is not related to ethnic prejudice. In 
sharp contrast, the Literal versus Symbolic dimension is highly negatively 
related to ethnic prejudice. These findings are compatible with earlier re-
search showing that there is no clear relation between being religious or not 
and being prejudiced or not, but that this is dependent upon how people deal 
with religion. More specifically, these findings suggest that what seems to 
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be crucially important is not so much whether one is religious or not, but 
the way in which religious contents are processed. If religious contents are 
processed in a literal fashion, one is more likely to be intolerant against peo-
ple of a different race and / or culture. In contrast, if religious contents are 
processed symbolically, one is unlikely to display ethnic prejudice. Hence, 
these results contribute to the debate whether religious people are more in-
clined to prejudice. When the way in which religious contents are processed 
is taken into account, the impact of being religious is trivial, implying that 
the danger of religious fundamentalism does not lie in religion as such but 
in the cognitive style that is promoted. 
 This is in line with Altemeyer (2003), who argued that the relationship 
between fundamentalism and prejudice should be accounted for by a general 
attitude towards whatever belief one holds, rather than in terms of particular 
belief system. According to Altemeyer, fundamentalists are characterized by 
two important tendencies: The tendency to show heightened identification 
with what they perceive to be the in-group and the tendency to show height-
ened rejection of what they perceive to be the out-group. Following this 
reasoning, it can be argued that Religious Fundamentalism (= RF) can also 
be displayed by non-religious people. Some non-religious people, namely 
those that process religious issues in a literal and closed-minded way, can be 
expected to show these very same tendencies. The only difference between 
religious and non-religious RF would then be the nature of the in-group. 
Whereas, for religious RF, the in-group will be the own denomination, for 
non-religious RF the in-group will be the group of atheists. From this per-
spective, both religious and non-religious RF can be expected to go hand 
in hand with ethnic prejudice that is grounded in RF. For instance, when 
thinking of immigrants, people in Western Europe spontaneously think of 
Muslims. This group of people is especially likely to become a target of 
RF. They will be a target of non-religious RF because of their religiousness, 
and of religious RF because of the fact that they belong to a non-Christian 
denomination. Duriez (2004a) has shown that this religious ethnocentrism 
cannot be reduced to differences in authoritarianism or to differences in 
empathy and perspective taking (see below).
Religion and Pro-Sociality
Apparently, although, compared to non-religious people, religious people 
obtain higher scores on measures of right-wing authoritarianism, they do 
not display elevated levels of ethnical prejudice. But of course, there are 
several other domains apart from ethnic prejudice in which anti-social 
behavior and anti-social attitudes can be displayed. In this section, we will 
further investigate the potential impact of religiosity on prosocial attitudes. 
More specifically, we will summarize results obtained in studies relating the 
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two dimensions of religiosity that are derived from the Post-Critical Belief 
Scale to two individual difference dimensions that are supposed to predict 
prosocial behavior: Empathy and morality. 
Religion and Empathy
Recently, McFarland (2001) made a review of all the known individual 
differences that relate with one or more form(s) of prejudice, and set up a 
series of studies to identify the most important prejudice dispositions. Ac-
cording to McFarland (2001), apart from RWA and SDO, a third prejudice 
disposition is constituted by lack of empathy. In line with this, Batson 
(1983) argued that empathy mediates a kin-specific altruistic impulse that is 
part of the human genetic heritage, and that one of the functions of religion 
is to extend the range of this altruistic impulse beyond the kinship circle. 
Religion achieves this through the use of kinship language and imagery: By 
teaching that we are all children of God, religion enhances an altruistic im-
pulse that is already present, extending it from the kinship circle to human 
kind in general. However, it is clear that religion does not always succeed 
in this (see above).
 Because it is considered fundamental to altruism and helping behaviour 
(e.g., Batson, 1991, 1998), Duriez (2004b) focussed on empathy. It was 
shown that, whereas empathy is unrelated to Exclusion versus Inclusion, 
it is positively related to Literal versus Symbolic. These results contribute 
to the debate whether religious people are more inclined to feel empathy 
towards their fellow men and, hence, are more likely to provide help to a 
person in need. The answer is no. Apparently, this debate has its origin in 
the fact that the religiosity measures that have been used in previous stud-
ies confuse being religious or not with the way in which religion contents 
are processed. When separating both aspects, religiosity has no connection 
with empathy whatsoever. In contrast, the way in which religion contents 
are processed tells a great deal about whether one is likely to experience 
feelings of empathy and, hence, presumably, to display helping behaviour. 
These findings are in line with the relations between the religiosity dimen-
sions on the one hand, and Agreeableness, Self-Transcendence and Self-
Enhancement values, prejudice, and authoritarianism on the other hand (see 
above).
Religion and Morality
Kohlberg (1981) argued that religiosity and moral reasoning are inherently 
unrelated because they constitute two distinct areas of human concern. 
Whereas moral decision making is grounded in rational arguments of jus-
tice and is influenced by level of cognitive development (e.g., education) 
and exposure to socio-moral experiences (e.g., role taking opportunities), 
religious reasoning is based on revelations by religious authorities. Thus, 
whereas the primary function of morality would be to resolve competing 
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claims among individuals, the primary function of religion would be to 
affirm morality. In other words, whereas moral reasoning provides moral 
prescriptions, religious reasoning affirms moral judgment as meaningful. In 
spite of this, several researchers attempted to associate both concepts and 
have come to the conclusion that religiosity and morality are not unrelated 
at all (Duriez, 2003b). However, some researchers (e.g., Wahrman, 1981) 
have argued that the apparent religiosity-morality relation can probably be 
explained by cognitive processes such as dogmatism. Given the fact that the 
PCBS allows to disentangle the effects of being religious or not (Exclusion 
versus Inclusion) from the way in which religious contents are processed 
(either in a literal or in a symbolical way), and given the fact that the Literal 
versus Symbolic dimension relates to dogmatism and closed-mindedness 
(for a recent overview, see Duriez, 2003a), the PCBS allows to directly test 
this hypothesis. 
 In this respect, Duriez (2003b) and Duriez and Soenens (2006b) exam-
ined the relation between the PCBS and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT; 
Lind, 1998). In the MJT, people are confronted with moral dilemmas. For 
each dilemma, a person has to indicate to which degree he agrees with the 
solution chosen by the main character(s). Next, this person is confronted 
with six arguments pro and six arguments contra his opinion on how to solve 
the dilemma. Each argument represents one of Kohlberg’s (1958) stages of 
moral reasoning. The sum score a person obtains for the arguments referring 
to the same stage indicates the degree to which this person reasons according 
to this socio-moral perspective. In addition, the C-index measures the degree 
to which the judgment about these arguments is consistent. A highly morally 
competent person will appreciate all arguments referring to a certain socio-
moral perspective, irrespective of whether it is a pro or contra argument, and 
will obtain a C-index close to 100. A person with low moral competence will 
appreciate the pro arguments only and will obtain a C-index close to zero. 
Results showed that the religiosity-morality relation that was observed 
in previous studies can be explained by the way in which people process 
religious contents. People processing religious contents in a symbolic way 
show higher moral competence. In addition, people processing religious 
contents in a symbolic way tend to make a sharper distinction between 
moral arguments of the lower stages of Kohlberg’s model and moral argu-
ments of the higher stages. In comparison to people that process religious 
contents in a literal way, they tend to pay less attention to arguments of 
the lower stages and more attention to arguments of the higher stages. In 
contrast, in all samples, being religious as such was unrelated to both moral 
attitudes and moral competence. Results supported the idea of Kohlberg 
(1981) that religiosity and morality are inherently unrelated and the idea 
of Wahrman (1981) that the religiosity-morality relation that was observed 
can be explained by cognitive processes. These findings are perfectly in line 
with the findings reported above on intolerance, empathy, etcetera.
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Religion and Personal Well-Being
And now for something completely different. Whereas all of the studies that 
were summarized so far speak about the social aspect of religion, converg-
ing on the conclusion that there appear to be no real substantial differences 
between religious and non-religious people, the next section will deal with 
the impact of religion on everyday personal functioning. Research argues 
that religiosity does have an impact on personal well-being. The reason 
for this would be that more religious parents, who are known to generally 
produce a more religious offspring, tend to socialize their children in a spe-
cific way, which would, in turn, impact on the personal well-being of their 
offspring. The data we gathered so far with the Post-Critical Belief Scale 
do indicate that there is an intergenerational transmission of both being 
religious or not as such and of the way in which people process religious 
contents. However, because these data were not reported anywhere (so far), 
we will not go into this in more depth. We will limit ourselves to discussing 
our findings concerning how religiosity relates to parenting, after which we 
will look at whether religiosity relates to well-being. Finally, we will look 
at relations between people’s general motivation, motivation for religious 
behaviors and their outlook on religious issues.
Religion and Parenting
Studies that have examined the relation between parental religiosity and 
parenting have typically focused on parents of preadolescents and on nar-
row parenting outcomes such as spanking, corporal punishment and physical 
discipline in general (Mahoney, Pargament, Tarakeshwar & Swank, 2001). 
According to Mahoney et al. (2001), studies tend to converge on the con-
clusion that parents who are affiliated with conservative Christian groups 
or who hold literalist beliefs are more likely to endorse and use corporal 
punishment. However, Wilcox (1998) has shown that parents who hold 
conservative theological beliefs are also more likely to hug and praise their 
children. Together with the finding that greater parental religiosity relates to 
a stronger emphasis on child obedience (Jackson et al., 1999), this suggests 
that conservative theological beliefs go hand in hand with both strict paren-
tal discipline and an unusually warm and expressive parenting style.
 Although a multitude of studies addressed the importance of parental 
religiosity among parents of preadolescent children, few studies have in-
vestigated the relation between religiosity and parenting among parents of 
adolescents. The studies that have been conducted suggest that greater pa-
rental religiosity relates to positive parenting qualities (for an overview, see 
Duriez, Soenens, Neyrinck & Vansteenkiste, submitted). Because previous 
research failed to do this, Duriez et al. (submitted) decided to use multi-
dimensional measures of religiosity (the PCBS) and parenting, and to use 
parent and adolescent reports of the parenting constructs in order to exclude 
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problems of shared method variance. As for the measurement of parenting, 
Darling and Steinberg (1993) argued that, in order to understand parental 
influence, parents’ rearing style (i.e., how parents socialize their children) 
should be distinguished from the goals they promote (i.e., what parents 
socialize in their children). Following this recommendation, Duriez et al. 
(submitted) paid attention to parenting styles and parental goal promotion. 
 As far as parenting styles are concerned, Duriez et al. (submitted) looked 
at parental need support (which pertains to the quality of the parent-child 
relationship) and parental regulation (which relates to parental regulatory 
and structuring capacities). Need support would diminish vulnerability to 
internalized problems (such as depression and anxiety) (Barber & Harmon, 
2002) and would to relate to indicators of adjustment (Gray & Steinberg, 
1999). Adequate regulation should provide adolescents with a clear set of 
guidelines for appropriate behavior and teach them to self-regulate and 
become less susceptible to negative peer influences and, hence, prevent 
them from engaging in antisocial behavior such as delinquency and drug 
use (Barber, 1997). As far as parental goal promotion is concerned, Duriez 
et al. (2007) looked at the promotion of intrinsic versus extrinsic and open-
ness to change versus conservation goals. Intrinsic rather than extrinsic goal 
promotion would increase engagement, performance, achievement, and 
persistence (Vansteenkiste, Simons, Bachman, Braet & Deci, 2005; Van-
steenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon & Deci, 2004; Vansteenkiste, Simons, 
Soenens & Lens, 2004), as well as to prevent adolescent prejudice disposi-
tions such as RWA and SDO (Duriez, Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2007). The 
parental promotion of conservation rather than openness to change goals 
would increase RWA (Duriez, et al., 2007), which is associated with indices 
of defensive functioning, such as a normative identity style and a heightened 
need for closure (Soenens, Duriez & Goossens, 2005; Van Hiel, Pandelaere 
& Duriez, 2004).
 When differences in religiosity are separated from differences in religious 
cognitive style, religiosity as such no longer seemed to have positive effects 
on parenting. Differences in being religious related to differences in conser-
vation goal promotion only, with more religious parents being more inclined 
to promote conservation goals at the expense of openness to change goals. 
In contrast, an openminded religious cognitive style does seem to relate to 
better parenting. A symbolic approach to religion related to need support 
and the promotion of intrinsic rather than extrinsic goals. In short, results 
suggest that the effects of being religious on parenting are limited, and not 
very positive. Having an openminded religious cognitive style, however, 
does seem to relate to better parenting.
Religion and Mental Health
A controversial issue in the field of the psychology of religion concerns the 
question whether religion impacts on mental health. Throughout history, 
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opinions on this relationship were sharply divided. For Freud (1962), for 
example, religious ideas are illusions, while Jung (1933) considered reli-
gion as necessary for mental health. In recent years, the debate continued. 
Whereas Bergin (1991) believed that religion can be powerfully beneficial 
and should therefore be integrated in psychotherapy, Ellis (1980) stated that 
religion is associated with emotional disturbance. 
 Literature reviews concerning empirical research identified hundreds of 
studies investigating the link between religion and mental health (Hackney 
& Sanders, 2003). However, no consensus is yet reached. Although several 
researchers still search for an unambiguous answer to the question whether 
religion has a positive or a negative influence on individual’s mental health, 
it becomes more and more clear that this question is too simple to catch 
the complex reality. The multidimensionality of the concept of religion can 
be one reason why a simple and straightforward answer to the question 
concerning the impact of religion on mental health is not possible. Conse-
quently, several researchers recently indicate that more attention should be 
paid to the operationalization and measurement of religion.
  In this respect, Dezutter, Soenens, and Hutsebaut (2006) assumed that 
the use of the Post-Critical Belief Scale might enhance our insight in the 
complex relation between religion and mental health. They argued that 
disentangling between religious beliefs as such and the social-cognitive 
style to process religious contents may shed a more differentiated light on 
this relationship. Specifically, in line with the research conducted within 
the framework of the PCBS, they hypothesized that the Literal versus Sym-
bolic dimension would be more strongly related to individual functioning 
than the Exclusion versus Inclusion dimension. Results confirmed this, and 
showed that, whereas a literal approach of religious contents is associated 
with lower mental health, the Exclusion versus Inclusion dimension is unre-
lated to mental health. It was hypothesized that coping and stress appraisal 
mechanisms might account for this negative link between a literal approach 
of religion and mental health. Literal thinkers have been shown to score 
high on need for closure and low on measures of openness to experience 
and flexible identity management (Duriez, Soenens & Beyers, 2004). Given 
these characteristics, literal thinkers are likely to appraise stress and change 
as threatening and to engage in rigid and maladaptive coping mechanisms, 
which, in turn, create a vulnerability to negative well-being. 
Religion and Motivation
From the perspective of self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), 
the way in which people approach religious contents is expected to relate 
to a specific motivational pattern. Based on Hodgins and Knee (2002), an 
openminded outlook on religious information should relate to an autono-
mous causality orientation, whereas a closedminded interpretation should 
relate to a controlled causality orientation. Autonomously oriented people 
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initiate or regulate their behavior by personal interests and challenges or by 
well-internalized and self-endorsed values. People with a controlled orienta-
tion typically let their behavior be regulated either by internally controlling 
imperatives in terms of »should«, »must« or »have to« (introjected regula-
tion) or by events in the environment that are contingent upon behavioral 
enactment (e.g., external obligations, rewards or punishments).
 Consistent with this, Neyrinck (2006) showed that, whereas an au-
tonomous causality orientation relates to a symbolic approach of religious 
contents, a controlled causality orientation relates to a literal approach. The 
causality orientations were not significantly related to the Exclusion versus 
Inclusion dimension. Instead of looking at these general causality orienta-
tions, Neyrinck, Vansteenkiste, Lens, Duriez, and Hutsebaut (2006), inves-
tigated the relation between religiosity and (autonomous and controlled) 
regulations for religious behavior. Consistent with Neyrinck (2006), they 
found a symbolic approach of religious contents to relate to autonomously 
regulated religious behavior. 
Conclusion
The results that are summarized in this chapter substantiate the claim that 
the Post-Critical Belief Scale, which can be used to disentangle the effects 
of being religious or not (Exclusion versus Inclusion) from the way in which 
religion and religious contents are processed (either in a literal or in a sym-
bolical way), is an extremely valuable instrument to shed a new light on 
some important debates in the field of the psychology of religion. We will 
now briefly summarize this multitude of findings. Before doing so, we wish 
to stress once more that, although all of the results that were described are 
based on multiple samples, most samples were gathered in Flanders (Bel-
gium). However, whenever data from other countries are available as well 
(e.g., Duriez et al., 2003; Duriez et al., 2005), results appear cross-culturally 
valid. And although the Post-Critical Belies Scale was constructed for the 
use in a Christian context, initial data gathered with a modified scale among 
Belgian Muslims suggest that the results can also be generalized across 
denomination (Vancauwenberghe, Van Hiel & Duriez, 2007). 
Exclusion versus Inclusion
Religious people are unlikely to have specific personality traits, are neither 
more nor less likely to be prejudiced, to feel empathy towards fellow hu-
man beings, or to attain higher moral competence levels. Likewise, they are 
unlikely to be better parents, to feel better about themselves or to have a 
qualitatively different motivation. However, religious people do hold differ-
ent values (attaching more importance to traditional values). They are more 
likely to let themselves be guided by other people whenever they need to 
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make important decisions in life, are more likely to hold cultural conserva-
tive and right-wing authoritarian beliefs, and are more likely to prefer order, 
structure and predictability. In sum, religious people can be characterized as 
attaching more importance to traditional values, norms and social conven-
tions. The importance of this might stem from a psychological need for or-
der, structure and predictability. However, attaching importance to this kind 
of values does not seem to lead them to reject people that chose to live their 
lives according to different standards. In sum, apart from displaying some-
what more conservatism, it doesn’t seem to make a big difference whether 
one is religious or not. Hence, the Post-Critical Belief Scale seems to show 
that being religious or not as such does not have a lot of implications, and, 
hence, is not of much importance.
Literal versus Symbolic
People who process religious contents in a literal way are less likely to be 
agreeable and open to new experiences. They attach more importance to 
Self-Enhancement values as opposed to Self-Transcendence values, are 
more likely to hold culturally conservative and prejudiced attitudes. They 
are less likely to feel empathy towards fellow human beings and are less 
likely to attain high levels of moral competence. They are more likely to 
be closed-minded and intolerant of ambiguity, and whenever they have to 
make important decisions concerning their own identity, they fail to actively 
seek out relevant information and tend to procrastinate these decisions. Fi-
nally, they are less likely to be good parents, less likely to have a sense of 
personal well-being, and more likely to feel controlled rather than to feel 
autonomous. In sum, both on a personal and social level, although whether 
one is religious does not seem to be very important, the way in which people 
deal with religion and the way in which they process religious contents is 
extremely important. 
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Appendix A
The 33 item Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) and their labels 
(see Figure 1)
# Label Item
01 S1 The Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by perso-
nal reflection 
02 S2 If you want to understand the meaning of the miracle stories from 
the Bible, you should always place them in their historical context
03 O1 You can only live a meaningful life if you believe 
04 O2 God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is immuta-
ble 
05 E1 Faith is more of a dream, which turns out to be an illusion when one 
is confronted with the harshness of life 
06 S3 The Bible is a guide, full of signs in the search for God, and not a 
historical account 
07 O3 Even though this goes against modern rationality, I believe Mary 
truly was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus 
08 E2 Too many people have been oppressed in the name of God to still be 
able to have faith 
09 R1 Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was 
made 
11 O4 Only the major religious traditions guarantee admittance to God
10 S4 Despite the fact that the Bible has been written in a completely dif-
ferent historical context from ours, it retains a basic message 
12 R2 Ultimately, religion means commitment without absolute guarantee
13 S5 Because Jesus is mainly a guiding principle for me, my faith in him 
would not be affected, if it would appear that he never actually exi-
sted as a historical individual 
14 O5 Religion is the one thing that gives meaning to life in all its aspects
15 R3 The manner in which humans experience their relationship to God, 
will always be colored by the times they live in 
16 S6 The historical accuracy of the stories from the Bible is irrelevant for 
my faith in God 
17 O6 Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious que-
stion 
18 E3 God is only a name for the inexplicable 
19 R4 Official Church doctrine and other statements about the absolute 
will always remain relative because they are pronounced by human 
beings at a certain period of time 
Bart Duriez et al.792
# Label Item
20 E4 The world of Bible stories is so far removed from us, that it has little 
relevance 
21 O7 Only a priest can give an answer to important religious questions
22 E5 A scientific understanding of human life and the world has made a 
religious understanding superfluous 
23 R5 God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is 
changeable 
24 R6 I am well aware my ideology is only one possibility among so many 
others 
25 O8 I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written
26 S7 Despite the high number of injustices Christianity has caused 
people, the original message of Christ is still valuable to me 
27 E6 In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears
28 R7 Secular and religious worldviews give valuable answers to important 
questions about life
29 E7 In order to fully understand what religion is all about, you have to 
be an outsider 
30 E8 Faith is an expression of a weak personality 
31 R8 There is no absolute meaning in life, only giving directions, which 
differs for everyone 
32 E9 Religious faith often is an instrument for obtaining power, and that 
makes it suspect 
33 S8 I still call myself a Christian, even though a lot of things that I can-
not agree with have happened in the past in name of Christianity,
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Appendix B
The 18 item Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) and their labels 
(see Figure 1)
# Label Item
01 S1 The Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by per-
sonal reflection 
02 O2 God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is immu-
table 
03 E1 Faith turns out to be an illusion when one is confronted with the 
harshness of life 
04 S3 The Bible is a rough guide in the search for God, and not a histori-
cal account 
05 O3 Even though this goes against modern rationality, Mary truly re-
mained a virgin 
06 R1 Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was 
made 
07 S4 Even though the Bible was written a long time ago, it retains a 
basic message 
08 O4 Only the major religious traditions guarantee admittance to God
09 R3 The manner in which humans experience God will always be co-
lored by society 
10 O6 Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious que-
stion 
11 E4 The world of Bible stories is so far removed from us, that it has 
little relevance 
12 E5 Science has made a religious understanding of life superfluous
13 R5 God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is 
changeable 
14 R6 My ideology is only one possibility among so many others 
15 O8 I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are writ-
ten 
16 S7 Despite the injustices caused by Christianity, Christ’s message re-
mains valuable 
17 E6 In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears
18 E8 Faith is an expression of a weak personality 
